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BOOK REVIEW
BASIC TRIAL ADVOCACY
by Peter L. Murray*
(Little, Brown and Company, 1995; pp. 386, $22.95)
Reviewed by Michael W. Mullane**
Mary Crates taught me to "begin as you mean to go on."' Peter
Murray's book is a good place to begin for those embarking on a life
of trial advocacy. For those of us whose beginnings are distant and
often painful memories, it is an excellent reminder of where we
meant to go.
Trial advocacy is an infinitely complex task. This simple fact is
both its joy and curse. Teaching trial advocacy is equally difficult.
There is no "never" and no "always." There is a host of commonly
accepted maxims, many of which are contradictory on their face and
all of which are frequently dead wrong in specific application. The
complexity of the task is a siren call, luring both teacher and student
into a maze of abstract categorization and ephemeral "what if's."
Each is ever more divorced from the reality of persuading someone
to adopt your perspective of a historical event and its significance.
Roles and goals proliferate faster than mosquitos in a spring rain.
Story teller, scholar, zealous believer, professional sceptic, officer of
the court, counselor, impresario, teacher, naysayer, predictor, and
spin doctor are all part of the trial lawyer's job description. Credi-
bility of message and messenger, the mandate of law and policy,
conversion of information into evidence, the exclusion of adverse
evidence, procedural mandates and discretion, and the rules of law
all are concerns of the trial lawyer. As if the job were not difficult
enough, every role is played out in the presence of the ultimate
heckler. Every plan also must anticipate the arguments and strata-
gems of a skilled opponent. The adversarial environment is inher-
ently chaotic. Simplicity and clarity often are the first casualties of
any attempt to impose academic discipline on the subject.
Basic Trial Advocacy2 is a clear, simple guide to the major
problems confronting the trial lawyer. The book is both brief and,
with one omission, complete. Basic Trial Advocacy is exceptional
* Visiting Professor of Law, Edward L. Johnston Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School.
** Professor of Law and Director of Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic, University of
Maine School of Law.
1. Mary is my mother-in-law. She grew up on a farm in South Wales where
Welsh was the language of hearth, village, and chapel. English was the language of
outsiders. She breathes a millennium of Celtic family tradition and cultural wisdom.
2. PETER L. MuRRAY, BAsic TRIAL ADVOCACY (1995).
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among its peers, however, in how it begins. The first quarter of the
book is devoted to matters beyond the mechanics of opening state-
ments, presentation of evidence, and summations. The discussion
begins with an exploration of the societal, professional, and personal
environment of a trial attorney. This material is not an overdrawn
introduction. The author's purpose is clear. He begins by challeng-
ing the reader to think about how she will reconcile her personal
values with the demands of the profession.
The author begins by reducing the plethora of perspectives to an
essential few. The opening chapters describe the trial lawyer as
storyteller,3 teacher,4 and persuader.5 These three perspectives are
then synthesized into three specific tasks.
[T]he lawyer analyzes the available raw information to see
whether there is a potential fact picture that will fit a legal rule
with consequences favorable to the client.... Taking into ac-
count the opponent's anticipated presentation, the lawyer
chooses from among the potential scenarios the version that
(1) fits a rule favoring the interests of the client and (2) would
likely be accepted by the finders of fact.6
Having selected a factual theory, the second task is to "recreate this
fact image in the minds of the jury at the trial."7 What follows is a
superb short description of the balance between detail and brevity,
controlling the flow of evidentiary information, and selection of the
most effective media for presentation of the information.
In less than ten pages, the author establishes a concise structure
for both the book and the art of trial advocacy. This accomplish-
ment alone raises the text beyond many of its genre. It derives from
the author's clear vision of who and what the trial lawyer should be.
It is the should be that sets the book apart. The essence of Peter
Murray's vision is found in the third chapter: "Trial Lawyers' Eth-
ics."' My book shelves are burdened by most currently available
trial advocacy texts. Many contain excellent discussions of the ethi-
cal constraints on the trial lawyer. The subject is, however, often
given less than complete treatment. One trial advocacy text on my
shelf is almost nine hundred pages long. It devotes less than two
pages to the subject of ethics. In several others, including one of the
most well known, the word "ethics" does not appear in the tables of
contents or indices. Among those that address the subject, some
refer to ethics only episodically as a consideration that may arise in
the application of a specific skill or in the context of a certain activ-
3. Id. at 9.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 19-51.
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ity during a trial. Among this eclectic, not entirely random, and cer-
tainly unscientific sampling, Basic Trial Advocacy is unique in its
coherent treatment of ethics as a primary component of the trial
lawyer's skill training.9
If the subject of trial advocacy tends to shatter into fragments
under the stroke of abstract analysis, trial ethics crumbles to a pow-
der that scatters on the zephyr of every whisper. Basic Trial Advo-
cacy starts by identifying the ethical tension inherent in the
adversary system of fact determination.
The trial lawyer's special function, representing a client in a
formal proceeding to determine the objective truth, often cre-
ates ethical dilemmas. On the one hand, the lawyer must be a
faithful and effective exponent for the client. Our complex
legal system requires that parties involved with the law have
trained and dedicated representatives to protect their interests
and preserve their autonomy. On the other hand, the purpose
of the system is to find the truth. The role of the lawyer is an
integral part of that system. Most people have a positive re-
gard for truthfulness and an abhorrence of deliberate false-
hood. These values are important in our culture.
Many ethical issues are either created or exacerbated by the
potential for conflict between the roles of the lawyer as client
representative on the one hand and as an independent human
being and officer of the court on the other?0
What follows this description of the systemic ethical tension is a
wonderful essay in its own right. The author makes no attempt to
divorce either himself or the reader from the subject. He does not
sugarcoat the issue with objective gloss or academic distance. On
the contrary, he invites the student to come down from the tower,
stand in the arena, and experience the dilemma as a working advo-
cate. He describes the competing systemic demands and their ef-
fects on the human agent-the trial lawyer. The discussion is blunt,
to the point, and worth quoting at some length.
Is the image the trial lawyer seeks to recreate only an illu-
sion? Does the trial lawyer have any obligation to pursue ob-
jective "truth" in that which she presents to the factfinders? Is
the standard of accountability limited to what the lawyer can
"get away with" without offending either judge or factfinder?
Our adversary trial system, which gives the lawyers almost
the entire responsibility for presenting the fact image in court,
also puts them under great pressure to win for their clients.
9. Clearly the scope and depth of trial ethics requires treatment far beyond what
is possible in a primary text on trial advocacy. There are excellent volumes devoted
solely to the treatment of the issue within a single jurisdiction. See e.g., GARY L
STUART, THE EThCAL TRiAL LAWYER (1994). Nevertheless, a serious discussion of
the subject is an appropriate, if not mandatory, part of training in trial advocacy.
10. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 19.
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Trial lawyers also want to win for themselves. Sometimes the
lawyers, as they seek to represent their clients effectively,
seem more like sporting contestants, or even combatants, than
serious seekers after truth.
Another difficulty with trial lawyer ethics is that there is
some variation and disagreement among the trial lawyers
themselves as to what is and what is not ethically permissi-
ble.... This lack of unanimity among sincere and conscien-
tious scholars and practitioners on what is ethically required
means that some trial lawyers ultimately fashion their own
ethical codes within the overall bounds of the formal rules.
It should be also kept in mind that trial lawyers are con-
fronted with difficult ethical issues not in the comfort of their
offices and libraries but in the heat of battle, the give and take
of the courtroom. Under these conditions of fierce competi-
tion, if not combat, deliberate and detached consideration of
reason and policy is sometimes difficult, and it can be easy to
do something impulsive that is later regretted."
The author makes it clear that a lawyer's lack of certainty does
not excuse resolution of these issues by the default of neglect. Their
resolution is essential to becoming a trial lawyer. He also suggests a
number of resources from which the individual lawyer might draw
his answers. "An understanding of the ethical quandaries faced by
participants in the trial process and how those quandaries are re-
solved-whether by formal rule, by unwritten custom, or by the law-
yer's own sense of honor and integrity, is an indispensable
prerequisite to basic trial advocacy."12
The discussion turns to a survey of the minimal demands imposed
by the various formal codes of professional ethics. The heart of this
section is the discussion of the obligations of candor and truthful-
ness. The mandates of Disciplinary Rule 7-102 of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility' 3 and Model Rule 3.3 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct 4 are both described, and a sampling
of the dilemmas arising in their application are surveyed. The au-
thor frankly admits: "These and other provisions of the rules that
relate to the candor and integrity of the lawyer's presentation have
been interpreted and reinterpreted by lawyers, judges, and scholars
over and over again. No final answer has been found."' 5
11. Id. at 20-21.
12. Id. at 21.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 7-102 (1980) (requir-
ing compliance with procedural and substantive disclosure requirements and prohib-
iting a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in illegal or fraudulent activities).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.3 (1994) (requiring the
lawyer to disclose a material fact to the tribunal if necessary to prevent assisting the
client in consummating a criminal or fraudulent act).
15. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 24.
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Notwithstanding the absence of a final answer, the author enjoins
comprehension and adherence with the minimal ethical mandates.16
He makes it clear that, although the area is fraught with uncertainty,
there are known boundaries.
The focus is on three aspects of "The Obligation to Present the
Truth:"' 7 "Questions of Law,"' 8 "False Testimony and Evidence,"'19
and "False Inferences and Arguments., 20 The latter two involve is-
sues of particular difficulty. The problems swirling about the pres-
entation of false evidence are particularly acute in criminal cases.
The predominant view is that knowing presentation of per-
jured testimony of a criminal defendant... is clearly unethical
and improper. On the other hand, there are respected schol-
ars and practitioners who argue that the defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel requires that a criminal defense
lawyer be permitted to offer the defendant's own testimony,
regardless of whether it is known to be true or false.2 '
Professor Murray explains some of the ways that trial lawyers try to
avoid the clash. These include what can be called the Sergeant
Schultz school of reality avoidance.' Another approach is to warn
the client about the consequences of saying one thing in the inter-
view and another at trial. As Professor Murray points out: "Such
'Miranda warnings' can be confusing to the client at best, and, at
worst, invite the client to make up the 'official' story before telling
anything to the lawyer."' 3 Other lawyers try a preemptive educa-
tional strike. Before asking "what happened?" they provide advice
about the legal consequences likely to flow from various alternative
factual scenarios. Each of these approaches raises almost as many
difficulties as it solves. Nevertheless, they are the most frequently
advocated and used solutions. The author of Basic Trial Advocacy
then provides "the black letter rules [that] establish a meaningful
minimum level of lawyer integrity in the fact presentation
process."24
The last topic in the discussion of "The Obligation to Present the
Truth" is even more difficult. The section entitled "False Inferences
16. "These rules provide the profession's most authoritative articulation of the
trial lawyer's obligation of candor in the representation of clients in court. Under-
standing the requirements of these rules and obeying them scrupulously is a basic
necessity to effective trial advocacy." Id.
17. Id at 25.
18. Id
19. Id at 26.
20. Id at 29.
21. Id at 26.
22. Sergeant Schultz was a character in the Hogan's Heroes television show who
avoided a similar ethical crisis by firmly adhering to the principle: -I see nothing, I
hear nothing, I know nothing."
23. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 27.
24. Id at 29.
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and Arguments" does not benefit from even the dubious benefit of
being directly addressed by the Model Code of Professional Con-
duct and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. "By negative
inference as well as by long-established professional consensus, gen-
erating and arguing false inferences or conclusions from true proven
facts is not unethical."' 5 Can a lawyer attempt to impugn the credi-
bility of a witness whose testimony she knows is accurate? May the
lawyer call a witness to testify truthfully for the purpose of leading
the fact finder to a false conclusion? May the advocate elicit testi-
mony that a witness believes to be true, even if the lawyer thinks the
witness is mistaken? May counsel argue to a false conclusion? The
answers, at least in the defense of a client accused of crime, are in
the affirmative. All of which leads to the most troubling question of
all. If the lawyer ethically can do it, must she do it?
The blurring of the official rules standard and the absence of
agreement among scholars, judges, and practitioners give rise
to the risk that the externally imposed standards of candor for
in-court presentation will be set at the lowest common denom-
inator. It is not surprising that some experienced trial lawyers
counsel law students to do "what you can get away with" in
the courtroom and tell them that it is okay to play fast and
loose with the truth so long as one is not obviously putting on
blatant perjury.26
Peter Murray goes on to acknowledge the social value of personal
honesty and affirm that "[t]here is nothing about being a lawyer that
should prevent a person from prizing, and telling, the truth., 2 7 He
goes further. He points out that many practicing lawyers "formu-
lat[e] and follow[ ] their own personal codes of ethics., 28 He sug-
gests these personal codes are not committed to writing, but offers
the following as a sample:
* I will not represent any fact that I do not believe to be true.
* I will not seek to generate an inference that I do not believe
in.
* I will not seek to convince other than by logic, reason, and
public policy.
* I will not use trickery to confuse or distort what I know to
be fact.
* I will not seek to circumvent the requirements of procedural
or evidentiary rules.2 9
I find this passage troubling. He speaks truth but misses an oppor-
tunity. Most trial lawyers do develop their own personal codes of
ethics, which are usually well within the outer limits of mandated
25. Id
26. Id at 32.
27. Id at 33.
28. Id at 32.
29. Id at 32-33.
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behavior. It is also correct to suggest that most of us do not commit
these personal codes to writing. Why not encourage the practice?
Inspired by the internal conflicts it awakened within me, I was
moved to attempt a written statement of my personal ethical code.
The attempt was more difficult than I might have wished, but more
fruitful than I had imagined. I recommend it for both the beginner
and the experienced practitioner.
Turning from process to substance, I cannot agree with some of
the specific suggestions set out in the proffered list, although I sus-
pect the author and I are separated more by semantics than sub-
stance. For example, the first item is troubling. It suggests the trial
lawyer must decide what is true, and then conform her advocacy to
that vision of truth. My approach proceeds in exactly the opposite
direction. Experience has taught me to be very slow to decide
where the truth lies. The lawyer's belief in what is and is not fact is
largely irrelevant, and is often an obstacle to effective representa-
tion. The advocate's job description does not include truth finder.
It does require her to predict what the fact finder will decide is the
truth. It also requires her to persuade the fact finder of what it can
and should decide is true. In both tasks, personal belief is more an
obstacle than a help. Once we have reached a decision, most of us
have a hard time viewing new information objectively. The strong
tendency is to overvalue information that reinforces the wisdom of
our decision, and discount information that suggests we are wrong.
Not deciding is helpful in predicting how another person will view
the evidence. It is also helpful when formulating a plan of persua-
sion. Indeed, one of the few ethical certainties is the rule against an
advocate's trying to persuade by stating her personal belief or
opinion. 30
The remaining points in the suggested list raise similar problems
for me. The point, however, is not my divergence of opinion. It is
the call to personal inquiry and decision.
Finally, assuming the reader has adopted a personal code of ad-
versarial conduct, the author addresses the question of what to tell
the client about these personal predilections. He suggests the need
to advise the client early in the representation that the lawyer is
"adhering to standards of candor and integrity more stringent than
are demanded by the official rules. '' 31 The lawyer should explain
30. Rule 3.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part:
A lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial .... assert personal knowledge of facts in issue .... or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness,
the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused;
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1994).
31. MURRAY, supra note 2, at 34.
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
how her personal standards might affect the representation, leaving
the client to make an informed decision about continuing the rela-
tionship, or seeking "assistance from a lawyer who works closer to
the official line."
3 2
There are three other topics included in the discussion of ethics.
The first is a very practical exposition of the "Unwritten Rules of
Legal Ethics, 33 followed by a brief survey of "How Ethical Issues
Arise." 4 The final topic, "Ethical Lapses in Court,"35 is dealt with
in more detail, including sections on: (1) improving the testimony,
(2) leading and prompting witnesses on direct examination, (3) good
faith questions on cross-examination, (4) tricks in court, (5) ethical
problems with objections, (6) misuse of [evidentiary] voir dire, and
(7) lawyer commentary and expressions of personal belief.36
The balance of the book embarks on an equally thorough yet con-
cise discussion of the basic advocacy skills. It begins with the prob-
lem of developing an appropriate fact theory, proceeds through the
highly parochial and arcane rules of courtroom etiquette, to the
basics of blocking, body language, and vocabulary selection.37 Fol-
lowing this discussion, the text considers each aspect of the standard
trial. In each section, the author displays his remarkable discipline
and skill as a reductionist. The discussion is illuminated by exam-
ples drawn from two cases that the author has used for years as the
basis for mock trials. Consequently, the examples are well thought
out, to the point, and tend not to raise more issues than they answer.
Given its overall excellence, the greatest flaw in Basic Trial Advo-
cacy is one of omission. There is no discussion of jury selection.
The absence of the subject is not due to oversight.
Despite its importance in those jurisdictions in which it is
still in widespread use, jury voir dire is not discussed in this
book. Trial lawyers practicing in jurisdictions where lawyer
voir dire of the jury panel is permitted should consult some of
the growing body of literature on that subject.38
The decision to exclude discussion of this topic is unfortunate.39
The art and pseudoscience of identifying juror prejudice and pre-
32. i&
33. Id. at 35.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id. at 38-51.
37. 1l at 67-96.
38. Id. at 47.
39. The decision undoubtedly reflects the author's professional environment. Pe-
ter Murray has maintained a successful trial practice from offices in Portland, Maine,
for many years. Under the Maine Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, direct
inquiry by counsel is left to the discretion of the trial justice. The long-standing local
practice has been to exclude or severely restrict the opportunity for lawyers to ad-
dress the prospective jurors directly. See ME. R. Civ. P. 47 and ME. R. CRIM. P.
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conception as an insight to predicting a juror's ultimate decision is
well beyond the scope of any text on basic trial advocacy. Neverthe-
less, the impact of jury selection on advocacy is too important to
ignore, even in jurisdictions where the court usurps the voir dire.
Arguably, jury selection is at least one-third of trial advocacy.
The content and method of presentation of your case is clearly a
prime determinant of outcome. Equally important is what your op-
ponent will say. The stool has a third leg: the decision maker. The
uncovering and exclusion of individuals unlikely to accept your cli-
ent, theme, evidence, or argument is an essential part of advocacy.
Furthermore, if the theory of primacy has any validity, the process
by which jurors are selected will impact their perception of both par-
ties' presentations. The fact that the judge asks the questions can
only serve to enhance that effect.
The opportunity for advocacy during winnowing of the panel sur-
vives judicial control. The minimum threshold of subtlety is un-
doubtedly higher. The opportunity to abuse the process is lessened.
Nevertheless, the jurors will answer questions. Their answers will
disclose something about how they are likely to react to your case.
Those who survive to hear the case will be influenced by the ques-
tions asked of them. Their perceptions of the case also will be influ-
enced by the answers to those questions-both their own and those
of others. A friend of mine used to say: "Trial advocacy starts in the
parking lot." I can remember practicing my summation while wait-
ing for a red light on the way to work one morning, only to realize a
juror was in the car next to mine. Wherever the day's trial starts, it
is well underway by the time the jury is sworn.
Basic Trial Advocacy is simple, thorough, and concise. The au-
thor's intellect and engaging personality are evident throughout the
book. He is a skilled trial lawyer who has spent years thinking
about his trade. Like many of the breed, he holds strong opinions.
He is not shy about stating what he believes and why. Peter Murray
is also a skilled teacher. He does not attempt to demonstrate his
own knowledge by displaying complexity, he uses it to achieve sim-
plicity and clarity. Peter Murray avoids the temptation to tell every-
24(a). The practice is the same in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine. D. ME. LOCAL R. 23. The leading case on the issue is State v. Moody, 486
A.2d 122 (Me. 1984).
As we have previously observed, the presiding justice, "above all others,
is the immediate custodian and steward of justice in the circumstances and
exigencies of the particular case." In the conduct of voir dire, therefore, it
is his responsibility to balance the competing considerations of fairness to
the defendant, judicial economy, and avoidance of embarrassment to po-
tential jurors.
We have recognized the special role of the justice's expertise in the con-
duct of voir dire and have repeatedly stated that the presiding justice is
afforded considerable discretion in determining the scope of voir dire.
Id. at 125-26 (citations omitted).
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thing he knows and tries to cover what the reader needs to know.
The initial focus on ethics is typical. He does not shy away from
difficult issues or gloss over areas of academic and professional un-
certainty. His presentation acknowledges divergent opinions and
fairly presents the arguments in their support. The reader is en-
couraged to reach her own synthesis of professional obligations and
personal values.
Basic Trial Advocacy is worth reading. It is worth keeping. It is
worth reading again several years down the road at that point when
we all seem to forget how we meant to go on at the beginning.
